IL DISCORSO DI JOSCHKA FISCHER SUGLI STATI UNITI D'EUROPA

Lecture by Joschka Fischer to the Heinrich Heine University in Düsseldorf

Allow me to begin with a personal request. For my second lecture on ‘Europe’s role in the world’, I had actually planned to address the key subject of European Neighbourhood Policy. During my first lecture at the Heinrich Heine University on 28 April 2010, I spoke about the current situation in Europe, which was a cause of great concern. Subsequently, in the three days between 7 and 9 May, the crisis intensified dramatically. This crisis ostensibly centred on the insolvency of the EU and euro Member Greece, but in reality, concerned the future of the European common currency and, therefore, the future of European integration itself. Heads of States and Governments of Eurozone countries (plus Sweden and Poland as non-euro EU Member States) were obliged, together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to put together a huge rescue package worth EUR 750 billion in order to protect Greek solvency.

This decision, which was no doubt only possible once the European vehicle had two wheels over the precipice and all on board had stared into the dark abyss of historic failure, fundamentally changed the euro area and the EU. After all, in every crisis lurks an opportunity.  Please allow me, therefore, to deviate from the agreed programme and to address, instead, these historic events and, above all, their consequences for Europe and its future. And with an old and yet – as recent events have shown – eternally young and indispensable European vision.  I hope you will indulge me in this.

During that aforementioned second weekend of May 2010, the Heads of State and Government reached a decision that brought fundamental change to monetary union, the EU and the euro area. Under pressure from the financial markets, which, with unflinching realism and within the space of a few weeks, quite unsentimentally swept aside all the years, indeed decades, of illusions, half-measures, blinkered self-absorption and continual self-denial of EU Member States, their Heads of State and Governments, their media and their political circles, Eurozone leaders had no choice but to let the EU project fail or to take a leap forward into the unknown. The huge step towards integration that was taken on that weekend in May represented something that Europeans had, in spite of all their efforts in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and the process leading from the European Convention to Lisbon, failed to achieve of their own accord in the 20 years that followed the end of the Cold War.

Whether it is a leap into a better future for the EU or into the depths of historic failure will soon become clear to us as witnesses of this turning point. Both scenarios are possible – please remember that! – even though I, personally, consider the former, positive, outcome to be the more likely, as the cost of the collapse of the euro and, consequently, of the EU would simply be too high for all those involved. I suspect that, in this event, even London would not be immune to panic.

Rational reasoning alone was never enough to free Europe from the nation-state mentality of the 19th century and to build a new continental order based on integration. It is merely realistic to note that, without the great tragedies of the first half of the 20th century, European unification could never have reached its current state. Without the force of circumstance, Europe is unable to make any real progress.

These three days in May caused quite a stir: The wording of the Maastricht Treaty, with its ban on bailouts, was, in practice (though not in principle), declared null and void, the ‘concerns’ of Germany’s Constitutional Court – to put it diplomatically – were simply brushed aside, Germany’s resistance to European economic governance crumbled, the Commission allowed itself to borrow in order to tackle the crisis, the ECB began to buy up the state loans of Member States at risk – all of which were previously complete anathema to the Eurogroup and, in Germany at least, decried as the end of the Western world – and the currency union became a real ‘Union of solidarity’ or, depending on your political viewpoint, a ‘transfer union’, worth EUR 750 billion.

This major transformation took place in part without the knowledge or involvement of the German Government or Chancellor, or in spite of their firm opposition, until, in the end, there was nothing they could do but agree to it. The media reported that the Chancellor had not known what was awaiting her in Brussels at that special summit on Greece; that French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi had planned and plotted, without consulting Germany, the largest economy in the EU.

To the Mediterranean region, Germany is now the villain of the piece that no one trusts any longer, even though our country has shown a great deal of solidarity with the region over the decades, through its net payments to the EU budget. We are isolated both within the EU as never before, and within the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, which is also unprecedented. Nevertheless, we will have to shoulder the greater part of the burden of the ‘rescue package for Greece’. I can think of no comparable course of events. There is no doubt that we are experiencing the lowest point in Germany’s European policy.

And why is that? Let us refrain from implying that the German Government is guilty of any political manoeuvring at home in order to prevent a decision on the Greek rescue package before the regional parliamentary elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, which, incidentally, as we are now aware, would have backfired. It was primarily a failure to grasp the scale and depth of this European crisis that made Germany the problem and not the solution in this predicament. It is true that Greece had continually and systematically violated the principles of the euro, since the leadership at the time had no qualms about falsifying figures and statistics. This behaviour deserves strong criticism, as it must never be repeated. On the other hand, while the desire for sanctions voiced in the German debate was understandable on an emotional level, politically and economically it was extremely unwise. You cannot punish an entire nation as you can individuals; instead you must alter the circumstances to allow them to construct a better future. In view of our own history, this is something we Germans know only too well. The German Government should never have given in to this public mood and the tabloid press, but should have robustly countered it and patiently explained the facts, the situation and the response which was necessary. Unfortunately, this is not what happened.

Amidst the justified outrage at the misconduct of previous Greek governments, it is now in Greek, German and European interests that Greece is helped through its necessarily tough reforms and that the country is given a chance to work its way out of the crisis. If people feel the need to satisfy an instinct for punishment, then they should turn their attention somewhere quite different and address the situation there, namely the financial sector. Very few people realise that the current crisis is only superficially about rescuing Greece and that it is really ‘Bank Bailout Part II’. If Greece had gone bankrupt, not only would Portugal, Spain and other weaker economies in the Eurozone been at risk of collapse, but there would also have been panic over government bonds and ‘systemically important’ banks and insurance companies would also have been in danger of bankrupcy, first and foremost in Europe, but also around the world.

When EU Heads of State and Government met in Brussels to discuss the Greek crisis, the interbank market, which is crucial for ensuring the liquidity of financial institutions, was already beginning to dry up once again, just as it did following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Once again, the global finance system stood on the brink and only by mobilising all forces, in the form of a monumental rescue package, could a second crash be prevented.

The German public and political world reacted to these events with distress and, mentally, with a lurch back to national interests. This crisis management exercise left people feeling duped, by France primarily, although it was chiefly the German Government’s disastrous mishandling of affairs that isolated Germany from the heart of decision-making within the euro area. After all, it was clear from the eruption of the Greek crisis in February 2010 what would happen. The financial markets smelt blood, leaving only one decision to be taken in Berlin: would the German Government defend the euro – yes or no? The decision in favour of the euro was right and necessary, unless someone wished to accept, and bear forever on their conscience, the destruction of everything that had been achieved in Europe since the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957. This decision needed to be followed up immediately, however, by resolute and coherent action, in order to face up to the markets. The financial markets looked to Germany above all, as the economically strongest and largest member of the euro area. The German Government’s tentative dithering had precisely the opposite effect and added considerably to the bill that Europe (and Germany) must foot. In the end, it only remained to ‘bail out’ Greece, although, as I have already mentioned, this was clear back in February.

This crisis has revealed a glaring leadership vacuum in the debate surrounding the euro and the future of Europe within Germany domestic policy and it cannot solely be put at the door of the Federal Government. Germany lives off its strength as an exporter, but this is inextricably tied up with the EU common market and the euro. Just under 70% of our exports remain within the EU, 50% of them within the euro area. Economically, Germany is the great beneficiary of European integration and the euro. Those that argue so vehemently against a ‘transfer union’ need only look at the annual net transfers we receive in the form of German trade surpluses, which, all too often, are then invested in government bonds issued by our EU partners. The EU, even as the EEC, has always been a ‘transfer union’. France received the common agricultural market for its large-scale rural economy and Germany the common market for its strong industry, and nothing much has changed since.

Another fact has been completely overlooked in the German discussion. The common currency protects Germany, more than any other Member State, against currency appreciations and depreciations in its most important export market, particularly during a global financial crisis. Without the euro, it is precisely Germany that would have had to deal with huge depreciations in partner currencies within the EU. Furthermore, without the euro the laborious rebuilding of German competitiveness through domestic reforms would probably have been greatly undone as a result. When, however, the mechanism of appreciation and depreciation can no longer be applied in the common European currency area, then, in a crisis of this magnitude, another way must be found to achieve balance, whether through direct transfers from stronger to weaker economies, which may always prove tricky from a domestic point of view, or through the introduction of new instruments, such as euro bonds, enabling the credit rating of stronger countries to be shared with those that are weaker. In practical terms, both these steps have been taken with the adoption of the European rescue package.

The German debate has been shaped by 2 other ideas which are more the expression of misplaced emotion and political short-sightedness than the result of sensible reflection: the exclusion of eurozone members who fail to comply with the common rules; and a reduced euro area that would include only the remaining economically strong countries, which would, in practice, amount to the expulsion of the Mediterranean countries.

People may still consider this exclusion scenario realistic in the case of small countries, which, politically and legally, it is not, as, according to the Lisbon Treaty; countries may only withdraw from the EU and not from the euro, and they certainly cannot be expelled. Does anyone in Berlin seriously believe that countries the size of Spain or Italy could, regardless of what happens, ever be expelled from the euro area without the whole EU disintegrating?

Let us just imagine, theoretically, that a smaller country, like Greece, is expelled from the euro. The country would go bankrupt immediately and, in the end, we still would have to bail out our banks or reckon with a further, imminent ‘system failure’. Far worse would be the political consequences. Greece is a member of the EU and NATO, an anchor for stability and security in the Balkans, the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean and therefore indispensable for the security of Europe as a whole. It borders that fault-line of global politics that is considered the most dangerous region of the world, the Middle East. To punish a country like this with ‘expulsion’ and therefore deliberately set about destabilising it, along the lines of Talleyrand, would be worse than a crime; it would be unforgiveable stupidity. How do people in this country think Russia and other non-European actors would react to such an absurd act of European self-sabotage? To be quite honest, I find this entire German debate, as you will have noticed, shocking in its naivety, maddeningly so.

And that brings me to my next point. Germany is not only the main economic winner in the EU, but is far and away the biggest political beneficiary of European unification. Without the European unification process and our country’s integration within the EU and NATO, it is unlikely that our neighbours would have given their approval to German reunification. And European unification is the prerequisite for lasting peace on our continent. But suppose, then, that someone should respond that unity is a fact, that we have it now and no longer need give it any concern. And that the argument about peace is an old one that no longer holds. What, then, is the purpose of Europe?

The answer is very straightforward. Reunified Germany, sitting at the heart of the continent, with its difficult history and its relentlessly problematic size, would, in a disintegrating EU – one that remained united in theory, but which, internally, had split into different groups of interests and was virtually no more than an EFTA-style common trade area – find itself in a very different and far worse situation than the one it faces today or will ever face in future in a strong, integrated Union. This difference between and a strong and weak Europe is of such overwhelming strategic and historical importance for our country and our neighbours that a strong and integrated Europe must be the uppermost priority for our national interest. It would be well-nigh foolish to ignore its importance.

And so we come to the question of European peace. This question is by no means obsolete or definitively settled. A weak Europe will become a danger to itself, above all, if it is no longer able to smooth out its internal disagreements. The threat will not be from tank armies and large-scale war; instead the dangers of the future will be those of collapsing states along Europe’s outer edges or within its interior. When we talk about European security and peace on our continent, today we refer primarily to this ability of European peoples and states to overcome their internal disagreements through closer relations and common institutions and no longer to voice it in conflict or chaotic disintegration. Anyone who believes that the status quo can be preserved and that further integration is not necessary will be bitterly disappointed. Without firm institutional integration, the present state of affairs will be only temporary.

In this, all European nations and states have an obligation, particularly the six largest EU Member States, because the course they set has a greater impact than that on smaller countries. Sadly, the United Kingdom and Italy have both – for very different reasons – put themselves on the sidelines. Spain is tackling a very severe economic and modernisation crisis, and Poland needs more time before it can play a serious leadership role in Europe. However, it will undoubtedly prove a positive force for Europe’s in the future. As things are, therefore, the situation will continue to depend on whether France and Germany, the two core nations of the EU, remain persistently and unwaveringly true to their European calling, in spite of numerous petty conflicts of interest, and are prepared to pay the political and economic price for their joint European leadership. It is clear that, in the most serious crisis for Europe since the founding of the EU, far more is at stake than the economy and ‘our money’, however important they are.

The intrusion of the financial market wolves into the serenely illusory world of the European sheepfold has a positive side, namely that it has delivered a huge reality check to Europeans. The common currency is now being tested to determine whether it is just that, i.e. whether there is enough weight and will behind it to guarantee it politically and economically. Harsh reality has presented us Europeans with a straight forward simple choice: there is no permanent guarantee of Europe’s status quo, and certainly not in a global crisis; and the choice, therefore, is between moving forwards or backwards, between further integration or the onset of disintegration. This historic choice will be determined by the fate of the euro and the euro area.

A decisive step in the right direction was taken by governments on 9 May. The European rescue package did not merely create from the Maastricht monetary union a ‘transfer union’ or ‘union of solidarity’ but, made provisions so that these decisions are effectively implemented, and thereby marked the beginning of European economic governance. I assume here that it was clear to all those involved what they were deciding on; if not, they will soon realise. Because a ‘transfer’ or ‘solidarity’ union, and the shared currency based upon it, can only function – as the lesson from the current financial crisis goes – if the budgetary, fiscal, financial, economic and social policies of the Eurozone countries are subject to far greater coordination in future, indeed, if they are harmonised in their outlook.

A union of solidarity will never work while some people retire at 67 and others at 55 or 60; while some duly pay their taxes and others do not; while some increase their competitiveness and others do not; while some save and others amass yet more debt. Let us abandon all illusions, ladies and gentlemen: all this will result in a significant encroachment on Member State sovereignty or it not work at all – in which case the euro as a common currency will also cease to function. It is one or the other – there is no alternative.

Ten years ago, in my speech on Europe delivered to the Humboldt University in Berlin, I referred to the following consequence of introducing the euro without sufficient political integration:

‘In Maastricht one of the three essential sovereign rights of the modern nation state – currency, internal security and external security – was for the first time transferred to the sole responsibility of a European institution. The introduction of the euro was not only the crowning point of economic integration; it was also a profoundly political act, because a currency is not just another economic factor but also symbolises the power of the sovereign who guarantees it. A tension has emerged between the communitarisation of economy and currency on the one hand and the lack of political and democratic structures on the other, a tension which might lead to crises within the EU if we do not take productive steps to make good the shortfall in political integration and democracy, thus completing the process of integration. It is precisely this step that lies ahead of the euro area.

The current European crisis is only superficially a financial crisis; in essence it is a political crisis caused by the political weakness of the EU and the euro area. The consequences of the global financial crisis must be borne not only by Europe, but by all nations. And the economic and financial differences between the individual States of America can be just as stark as those between the EU countries, if not starker. However, the dollar area does not have the political stability issues of the euro area. Why? Because the US currency area is overseen and guaranteed by a single sovereign government, by a single treasury and a single parliament.

Every currency combines economic function with political sovereignty, as it is ultimately political power that guarantees its value. The same applies to the euro. However the question of which sovereign power actually guarantees it has yet to be answered satisfactorily. The Eurogroup, Ecofin (the Council of Finance Ministers), the ECB, the Member State governments: all these institutions and their complex interactions remain nothing more than half-measures and are not enough to guarantee the common currency. This fact has been laid bare by the present crisis. The crisis has not highlighted the European currency’s inability to fulfil its function (which has withstood it admirably), but rather the inadequacy of its political foundations and general framework. Contractual rules and a European Central Bank alone are not enough to ensure the stability of a common currency during a perfect storm. Instead, it requires common governance – a common currency necessitates common economic governance.

Moreover, the German idea that, instead of real economic governance, the euro area can survive with merely tougher rules, firmer supervision and stricter sanctions in the event of failure to adhere to these rules – almost a form of internal IMF mechanism – will prove as misguided as the French view that there can be joint economic governance without pressing ahead with political integration. This seems to me a great mistake on the part of our French friends and neighbours, because it is impossible to hand responsibility for economic governance to Europe, while clinging onto nation-state sovereignty when it comes to political integration. Firstly, as we are seeing now, such a division of labour cannot work and, secondly, Germany will hardly agree to further economic integration – if at all – without the accompanying political integration.

Economic governance is also essential for the euro area as, in the present global economic climate, when economic and political weight is shifting dramatically away from the West (and therefore Europe) towards the emerging markets and when it is highly probable that the financial crisis will persist for some time yet, and we cannot rule out a repeat of the Greek crisis or something similar.

How then, even if there were political consensus among the euro area on all these issues, can the necessary Treaty amendments be achieved in the EU-27? After the catastrophic experiences with the Constitutional Treaty and the near-disaster with the Lisbon Treaty, further amendment to or adaptation of the Treaty on European Union appears rather improbable. Even after the recent glimpse into the abyss, there still remains sufficient Eurosceptic interests to prevent an amendment of the Treaty, which requires unanimity in the Council and in ratification by the Member States of the European Union (including referendums and high court scrutiny), from being adopted. Nevertheless, deadlock is in no way inevitable, as there are enough instruments within and outside the Treaty to develop economic governance, provided the political will to do so is present within the euro area and, most importantly, between France and Germany.

The euro area has shown in the most recent crisis that, even in times of difficulty and huge upheaval, it is still capable of acting. In doing so, it has more or less set itself up as the vanguard of the EU, as the introduction of the euro saw this group of countries hand over part of their core sovereignty as states to the Community and enter into a far firmer commitment than other EU Member States. Incidentally, if the euro area had grasped its role as vanguard of the EU and accordingly acted far sooner, we would have been in a better situation today. But here, too, it was Germany that, at every step in this direction, incomprehensibly blocked the way. The spirit of the Treaty dictates that no one who wishes to be involved should be excluded; this vanguard should always act inclusively, not exclusively. As a result, non-members such as Sweden and Poland have involved themselves in the rescue measures adopted by the euro area, while others, such as the United Kingdom, have kept their distance.

The vanguard-rearguard model even comes under the scope of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides, in civilian matters, for ‘enhanced cooperation’ (Article 20) and, in military affairs, for ‘permanent structured cooperation’ (Article 146). Eurozone Member States can also make inter-state and governmental agreements, as was previously the case with the intergovernmental Schengen agreement, allowing the abolition, outside the Treaties, of border controls on internal borders between parties to the agreement. In the meantime, the Schengen Agreement has become a firm part of the Lisbon Treaty.

If the EU is unable to act as one, then the euro area can and must act as its vanguard, firstly within the Treaty and, if that brings no results or they prove too slow, outside the Treaty, but in its spirit and in the interests of the Union. In any case, this would be only an interim solution, the goal being subsequent inclusion in the Treaty. Because, sooner rather than later, any economic governance by the euro area will cross the lines of intergovernmental cooperation and have undeniable institutional implications with regard to the Lisbon Treaty.

Two further problems remain to be discussed. It has become evident in the present monetary crisis that, in addition to the inadequate political architecture and safeguarding of the euro, the cultural difference in monetary and financial policy between Germany and France as chief guarantors of the euro has contributed quite substantially to the weakness of the European currency. In light of the events of the last few months, it is not unjustifiable to speak of something approaching a ‘clash of civilisations’. At the point in the Greek crisis when there should have been the utmost harmony and cooperation between France and Germany, these differences came to the fore and exacerbated the crisis quite considerably. As with an old married couple, the blame can be apportioned equally.

Germany follows the classic line of the former and present German Federal Bank, namely making monetary stability and the independence of the Central Bank an absolute priority. France, on the other hand, favours borrowing and political intervention. These differences, which are deeply rooted in both countries’ respective financial and economic cultures, have never been discussed in depth and there has certainly never been any attempt to find a compromise. This difference represents a further point of weakness in the foundations of the euro, as the real conflict lies not between Germany and Greece, but between Germany and France.

France would never allow a Mediterranean country to be expelled from the euro, whether for political and historical or for economic reasons. That some in Germany could hit upon this idea without even considering French interests and connections is another example of the estrangement between both partners, which has long been in evidence. Just as repellent is the French suggestion that Germans should be less efficient and productive in order to redress the trade imbalances in the euro area.

Without genuine compromise between German and French economic culture, there can be no viable economic governance, and without a workable Franco-German reconciliation of cultures, the euro cannot be equipped with a more stable political basis. If it is to work, such a compromise will have less of the Federal Bank mentality about it than hoped for by the Germans and feared by the French. In any case, the crucial thing is for both sides to attempt finally to reach a compromise. Short-term proposals at the expense of the other and personal animosities must not get in the way, as the stakes are far too high.

Allow me to attempt to address one final contradiction. On the one hand, the completion of a strong and integrated Europe is the decisive course for the future of all of us; on the other hand, and in spite of its great achievements past and present, this version of Europe is more unpopular than ever among most of its population. Why is that?

If you were even to ask the people of the Eurosceptic countries of northern Europe directly whether they wished to leave the EU, you would find no majority in favour of this proposal. But nor would you for the further integration of the EU. This shows that Europe is currently caught firmly between a rock and a hard place, between nation-states and integration. It appears to be going neither forwards nor backwards and the present financial crisis has proven that this stagnation is anything but harmless.

The EU (formerly the EEC, then the EC) has never been a project of the European peoples but rather a venture of the elite. The plan, following the devastation of the Second World War and in the light of the East-West divide, was for Europe, or just Western Europe back then, to be unified, step by step, from the top down. This elitist EU project has brought huge historical successes, but, with every additional step towards European integration, it has lost democratic legitimacy. European elections and a directly elected European Parliament have been unable to halt this process of decreasing legitimacy, merely serving to make it ever more apparent. With the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch referendums, this elite undertaking in the name of European integration from above finally reached its historical end-point. Even the Lisbon Treaty’s peculiar failure to make a public impact, its technocratic emptiness, points to this, even though it contains 90% of the Constitutional Treaty.

If Europe is to move forward in future, then it will be possible only via the battleground of democratic debate and the fight for democratic majorities in the Member States. However, a clear vision of the Europe of the future will also be needed and it will not be found in the intricacies of pragmatic and technocratic solutions and institutional changes, however important these are to the realisation of this vision. And that means that those of us want a unified Europe, the European integrationists, must leave behind the half-measures and pragmatic false compromises – and I, more than anyone, deserve strong criticism in this regard – and learn again how to express what really matters to us. The United States of Europe. Nothing more and nothing less.

The current crisis has shown us that half-measures cannot withstand harsh reality, nor can false compromises. It has also shown us that European visionaries were the true realists. And that only the path towards the United States of Europe can provide a real alternative to failure. The Union cannot remain stable indefinitely. That is the lesson being hammered home by reality today. We should not fool ourselves that this vision of the United States of Europe will meet with majority support in most EU Member States, or indeed in Germany. And without majorities we cannot take this step forward.

There is, therefore, only one thing European integrationists can do: roll up our sleeves and engage in the battle for democratic majorities. This battle will be long and tiring, but it will succeed, in the end, in securing democratic majorities in the countries of Europe that are in favour of a United States of Europe, marking the birth of a genuine European democracy. To fight for this goal is a worthy pursuit, especially when we are all too aware of the alternative.